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INTRODUCTION

Nature has always inspired artists, and depictions of flora and fauna
are prevalent in almost every artistic period and movement.' Today, some
of the most famous works of art portray elements of the natural world. No
Art History 101 course would be complete without a discussion of Monet's
* Copyright © 2008 by Morgan M. Stoddard.
1. See generally Eugenio Battisti, Zoomorphic and Plant Representations, in 14

936 (Inst. for Cultural Collaboration ed., 1967) (discussing art
depicting animals and plants); Giovanni Garbini et al., Landscape in Art, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD ART I (Inst. for Cultural Collaboration ed., 1964) (discussing landscape art).
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ART
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water lilies,2 O'Keeffe's jack-in-the-pulpits, 3 Cezanne's apples and
oranges,' Ansel Adams's landscapes,' and Barye's jungle cats.6 These
paintings, sculptures, and photographs have enriched our cultural heritage.
It is difficult to stand in front of Water-Lily PooP and not be awed and
amazed.
Works of art and photographs such as these' are protected by U.S.
copyright law,9 and artists"° generally enjoy robust protection.

Artists

possess, among other things, the exclusive right to reproduce their works,
make derivative works, and publicly display their works" for a specified
duration.' Although many people are likely to associate the phrase "work
of art" with the fine art just discussed, copyright law defines art much more
liberally, and "art" includes fine, graphic, and applied art. 3 As the
legislative history to the Copyright Act of 1976'4 emphasizes, all types of
art within this definition are protected regardless of aesthetic value or

2. See, e.g., Claude Monet, Water Lilies (1919), reprinted in 4 PRAEGER ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ART 1400 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Georgia O'Keeffe, Jack-in-the-Pulpit, No. 5 (1930), reprinted in LLOYD
GOODRICH & DORIS BRY, GEORGIA O'KEEFFE illus. 69 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Paul Cezanne, Still Life with Apples and Oranges (c. 1895-1900), reprinted in
I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARTISTS 86 (William Vaughan ed., 2000).
5. See, e.g., Ansel Adams, Yosemite Valley Storm (1944), reprinted in REINVENTING THE
WEST: THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF ANSEL ADAMS AND ROBERT ADAMS illus. 6 (2001).
6. See. e.g., Antoine-Louis Barye, Lion and Serpent No. 2 (c. 1858), reprinted in WILLIAM
R. JOHNSTON & SIMON KELLEY, UNTAMED: THE ART OF ANTOINE-LOuIS BARYE 101 (2006).
7. Claude Monet, Water-Lily Pool (1899), reprintedin 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ART
illus. 130 (Inst. for Cultural Collaboration ed., 1965).
8. Not all of the works by the artists mentioned are necessarily protected by U.S. copyright
law. For example, works published prior to 1923 are not protected. Lolly Gasaway, When
Works Pass Into the Public Domain (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.unc.edu/-unclng/public-d.htm.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Both two- and three-dimensional works of art and photographs
are protected as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Id. § 101.
10. The Copyright Act grants rights initially to "authors." See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(c) (2000)
(vesting the ownership of a work's copyright with its author or authors); see also id. § 106 (listing
rights of copyright owners). This is constitutionally required due to the text of the Copyright
Clause. See infra note 27 and accompanying text; see also I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.06[A] (2006) ("[U]nder the Constitution, only an author is
entitled to copyright protection .... " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This Comment uses the term "artist" instead of author because it concerns only works of
art and photographs, and not other works of authorship. See § 102(a) (listing the categories of
works of authorship). The term "artist" is used as substitute for author and is not meant to have a
different meaning.
11. See § 106. An artist who creates a work of visual art also has rights of attribution and
integrity. See id. § 106A; see also § 101 (defining a "work of visual art"). These rights are,
however, subject to a number of statutory limitations, such as fair use. See id. § 107 (2000).
12. Id. § 302-05 (2000).
13. § 101.
14. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A §§ 101-805 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007)).
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potential commercial use. 5 So, art, in the copyright sense
of the word,
6
includes fabric designs, lawn ornaments, toys, and jewelry.
It may seem surprising that works of art and photographs inspired by,
based on, or depicting nature are entitled to anything less than the most
ardent copyright protection, but a number of issues arise when dealing with
natural works 7 that are primarily the result of constitutionally mandated
limitations on copyright, such as the requirement of originality18 and
prohibition on the copyright of ideas. 9 These limitations can cause
problems for artists who seek to use copyright law to protect their natural
works. For example, suppose an artist travels to Bahrain in order to paint
the famous Tree of Life,2" and the painting is highly realistic. One could
argue that because the artist is merely copying what already exists in nature
and elements of nature are in the public domain, 1 the work is not original
as defined by copyright law. 2 If a work is not original, it cannot be
copyrighted, and anyone is free to copy it. Even if the painting is found to
be sufficiently original, the artist cannot prevent another from going to
Bahrain and painting, photographing, or sculpting the Tree of Life because
copyright protects an artist's original expression of an idea, not the ideathe Tree of Life-itself.23 The artist also cannot prevent others from using
expression that is necessary to depict the Tree of Life, such as its general

15. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667
(stating that the "definition of 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' carries with it no implied
criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality" and includes "works... intended for
use in advertising and commerce"); see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903) ("A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that
it is used for an advertisement.").
16. See infra Part V.
17. The phrase "natural works" or "natural work" as used in this Comment means works of
art and photographs inspired by, based on, or depicting nature.
18. See generally infra Part I (discussing originality requirement).
19. See generally infra Part Il (discussing copyright and ideas). These limitations are
constitutionally mandated because the purpose of granting artists exclusive rights to their works is
not foremost to secure economic enrichment for their efforts, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 247 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Under the U.S. Constitution, the primary objective of
copyright law is not to reward the author ....
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 17 (1988))),
but to "promote the Progress of Science." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. See generally infra Part I
(discussing the purpose of copyright law). These limitations further that objective.
20. The Tree of Life is a 400-year-old acacia tree that grows in an otherwise barren desert of
Bahrain. The tree is famous because the source of its water is unknown. See Michael Martinez,
Symbolic Tree of Life Faces Uncertain Future, CtU. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2001, at 37.
21. The "public domain" is the "universe of inventions and creative works that are not
protected by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to use without
charge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1265 (8th ed. 2004).
22. See infra Part Il.A (defining originality in copyright law).
23. See infra Part IH.A (discussing prohibition on copyright protection for ideas).
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shape, color, and location in the desert.24 These seemingly straightforward
rules are difficult to apply because it is hard to determine precisely what
qualifies as the artist's protected, original expression of the Tree of Life
and what qualifies as the idea of the Tree of Life and the expression
necessary to depicting the idea of the Tree of Life.25 If the dividing line
between original expression and ideas/necessary expression is inaccurate,
however, the artist's original expression, which should be protected by
copyright, may instead be copied freely.
This Comment argues that original artistic expression in natural works
is often undervalued or not recognized, which weakens artists' ability to
enforce their rights and prevent unlawful copying of their natural works.
The nonrecognition or undervaluation of original artistic expression in
natural works can result in (or be the result of) requiring too much
originality, defining the idea depicted by the work too broadly, considering
too much expression as necessary to the depiction of the idea, or assigning
the work a thin copyright. This outcome is unacceptable because it can
undermine the constitutional purpose of copyright-to encourage creativity
for the benefit of the public via an economic incentive.26
Part I of this Comment discusses in more detail the purpose of
copyright law and how it enriches public life. Part II explores the
originality requirement and includes a discussion of the requirement as it
pertains to works of art in particular. This Part will show that the amount
of originality required to copyright a work of art or a photograph is quite
low. Part III describes the dichotomy between ideas and expression and the
related doctrine of merger, which provides the background necessary to
understanding what parts of natural works can and cannot be protected by
copyright. Part IV explains the modem substantial similarity analysis.
Whether a work infringes another depends in part on whether the two are
substantially similar, so a preliminary understanding of the analysis is
needed in order to understand how the courts discussed herein decided if a
work was infringing. Part V summarizes numerous cases that involve
natural works in order to catalog the types of works for which these issues
often arise and highlight what is at stake. Finally, Part VI, using examples
from Part V, explains how original artistic expression in natural works is
overlooked or undervalued and why this subsequently results in the works
receiving inadequate protection under copyright law.

24. See
necessary to
25. See
26. See

infra Part If.B (explaining prohibition on copyright protection for expression that is
the depiction of a particular idea).
infra notes 77-79, 89-90 and accompanying text.
infra Part I.
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I. PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
Congress's power to grant artists copyright protection for their works
of art and photographs comes from Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of
Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive

Right to their respective Writings."27 As the text of the Copyright Clause
makes clear, copyright exists to benefit the public by encouraging artists to
create via an economic incentive: "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant ... copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors .... "28

Although

monopolies 9 were generally disfavored by the Founders,3" the limited
monopoly 3 granted to authors furthered the important goal of "increas[ing]
... the harvest of knowledge."3 James Madison, in The FederalistNo. 43,
noted that "the utility of [the Copyright Clause] will scarcely be
questioned" and the "public good fully coincides ... with the claims of

individuals."3 3
With the power granted to it by the Copyright Clause, Congress has
sought to further this purpose through the enactment of copyright

27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is commonly referred to as the Copyright
Clause. Copyright promotes the "Progress of Science" rather than the "useful Arts," see id., due
to usage at the time the Constitution was written. See RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF
COPYRIGHT LAW 15-16 (1925) (explaining that in the Framers' time, "science" meant "learning
in general" and "art" did not necessarily mean "fine art[]"); see also CRAIG JOYCE ET AL.,
COPYRIGHT LAW 63 n. 1 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing textual reasons for this reading in addition to
eighteenth-century usage).
28. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that copyright "is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors ... by the provision of a special reward"). It is not universally
accepted that the purpose of copyright is to provide an economic incentive for authors and artists
to create. For a brief overview of the other theories of the purpose of copyright, see JOYCE ET
AL., supra note 27, at 51-61.
29. Copyright creates a monopoly because it grants artists exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2000).
30. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) ("Jefferson, like other
Americans, had an instinctive aversion to monopolies.").
31. Copyright creates only a limited monopoly because the exclusive rights are limited in
duration. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-05 (2000); Gasaway, supra note 8. The rights are also subject to
a number of other limitations. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-22 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
32. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
fedpapers/fed_43.html; see also Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1924) ("The
motive underlying ... copyrights of works of art is one readily appreciated. The beautiful and the
development of a love of the beautiful and of the artistic sense and taste is [sic] as much
necessary to a well-rounded life as are the useful things.").
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legislation. 4 The Copyright Act is ultimately a "system"35 that, along with
the cases interpreting and applying it, promotes the constitutional purpose
of copyright by finding the correct balance between the interests of artists
in receiving just compensation for their creations and the interests of the
public in benefiting from the artists' creative endeavors.36 As evidenced
below,37 this balance can be difficult to achieve, but courts must be ever
vigilant to maintain it.38 One component of copyright law that helps
maintain this balance is the requirement of originality.

II.

REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINALITY

For any work to qualify for copyright protection, it must be original.
In regard to works of art, the creativity component of originality has a
special significance.
A.

Originality Defined

Copyright law only protects "original works of authorship. 3 9
Originality means a work was independently created and possesses a
minimal degree of creativity.4" Independent creation merely requires that a
work was not copied from another.4 A work can even be an exact replica
of another and still be original in the copyright sense of the term42 because
originality does not mean unique or novel.43 For example, if a young artist
34. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-805 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007)). Previous versions of the Copyright Act are
available on the U.S. Copyright Office's Web site. U.S. Copyright Office, Historical
Information, http://www.copyright.gov/history/index.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
35. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6).
36. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984).
37. See infra Part V.
38. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 63 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Courts must "guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who
have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived
of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded." (quoting Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng.
Rep. 138, 140 (K.B. 1801))).
39. § 102(a) (emphasis added); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 345 (1991) ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality.").
40. Feist,499 U.S. at 345.
41. Id.

42. See id. at 345-46 ("To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other,
compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original, and hence,
copyrightable.").
43. The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 states that "[tihe phrase 'original
works of authorship,' ... does not include requirements of novelty [or] ingenuity." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5664. The lack of a
requirement for novelty is partly why one cannot copyright an idea. See Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ("The novelty of the an or thing
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in North Carolina, without ever having heard of or seen any works by
Jackson Pollock, miraculously created a painting identical to Pollock's
famous Autumn Rhythm," the work would not be denied copyright
protection for lack of originality.4 5
Although originality is required for a work to be copyrighted, a great
deal of originality is not.46 As long as an artist contributes something of her
own-independently created-and the work contains "more than a de
minimus quantum of creativity,"47 it is sufficiently original.48 Only if a
work completely lacks a "creative spark," or if the spark is "so trivial as to
be virtually nonexistent," will it be denied copyright protection for lack of
creativity.49 It is important to note that absent from this requirement is any

described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright. To give the author of
the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty
has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the
province of letters-patent, not of copyright.").
44. Jackson Pollock, Autumn Rhythm (1950), reprinted in MARILYN STOKSTAD, ART
HISTORY 1134 (3d ed. 2008).
45. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (stating
that "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode to a
Grecian Urn," he would be able to copyright the poem). The twin work also would not infringe
the copyright of Autumn Rhythm because there was no copying. See infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
46. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 ("[Tlhe originality requirement is not particularly stringent.").
47. Id. at 363.
48. Interestingly, expression may be original even if it was not intentional. See, e.g., Alfred
Bell, 191 F.2d at 105 ("A copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a
clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a
variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his and copyright it."). But see Mitel, Inc.
v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitrarily assigned
command codes used to activate a telecommunications device were not copyrightable for lack of
the requisite amount of creativity).
49. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359. The Supreme Court in Feist found that a standard telephone
directory containing an alphabetical listing of subscribers was not sufficiently creative to warrant
copyright protection. See id. at 362 (arranging the subscribers "alphabetically by surname... [is]
devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity"). A pre-Feist case in which a work of art was
denied copyrightability for lack of creativity is John Muller & Co. v. N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team,
Inc., 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986). In John Muller & Co., the court of appeals upheld the
Register of Copyrights's refusal to register a soccer team logo that consisted of "four angled lines
which form an arrow and the word 'Arrows' in cursive script below the arrow" because it was not
creative enough. Id. at 990. And, in a very recent example, online maps derived from U.S.
Census maps that enabled users to locate real estate appraisers were denied copyright for
insufficient creativity. See Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Additions to the
preexisting maps such as color, shading, and labels using standard fonts and shapes fall within the
narrow category of works that lack even a minimum level of creativity .... "). The court of
appeals reasoned that the added features of the appraisal maps lacked the requisite amount of
creativity because they resembled the types of works specifically listed in U.S. Copyright Office
regulations as not copyrightable for lack of creativity. See id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2007)
(listing "names, titles, slogans[, and] familiar symbols or designs" as not copyrightable)).
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consideration of the amount of time or effort spent creating a work, which
has no bearing on its copyrightability5
Originality is a constitutional requirement in addition to a statutory
one because originality is inherent in the definition of "Writings" and
52
5
"Authors" as used in the Copyright Clause. In the Trade-Mark Cases,
the Supreme Court held that for a work to constitute a writing and be
eligible for copyright protection, it had to be original,53 and in BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony54 the Court defined an author as the
person who was the "originator" of the work or the person "to whom [it]
owes its origin."55 The creativity component of originality also owes its
recognition as a constitutional requirement to these two cases,56 in which
the Supreme Court held that "writings" must be "founded in the creative
powers of the mind,"5 7 and copyright protects only "original intellectual
conceptions of the author."5 8
B.

Special Case of Works of Art

The creativity requirement plays a unique role in the case of works of
art.59 Whereas creativity is required in all pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works 60 "as a matter of policy," 61 creativity is required in works of art "as a
matter of definition. 62 If a work is not creative in some way, "it cannot by
definition be regarded as a work of art. ' 63 However, the level of creativity
50. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 353 (rejecting "sweat of the brow" copyright); see also Rockford
Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The
input of time is irrelevant. A photograph may be copyrighted although it is the work of an instant
and its significance may be accidental. In fourteen hours Mozart could write a piano concerto,
J.S. Bach a cantata, or Dickens a week's installment of Bleak House.").
51. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (citing the cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 5255 for the rule that "[olriginality is a constitutional requirement")
52. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
53. Id. at 94.
54. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
55. Id. at 57-58.
56.

See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 ("As in The Trademark Cases, the Court [in Burrow-Giles]

emphasized the creative component of originality.").
57. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at94.
58. Burrow-Giles, Ill U.S. at 58.
59. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08[B][1] ("This requirement [of creativity] is

evident in connection with works of art in a manner which differs qualitatively from the
application of the creativity requirement for other works .... ").
60. 37 C.F.R. 202.10(a) (2006) ("In order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form.").
61. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08[B][I].
62. Id. Works of art, or more specifically, "works of fine, graphic, and applied art," 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000), and photographs, id., are only two types of works defined and protected as
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." Id. (including also by definition "prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings").
63. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08[B][ I].
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required still remains minimal,' 4 and the definition of a work of art remains
broad.65
The creativity requirement for works of art must remain low because
requiring more may tempt judges to evaluate the aesthetic merit of the
work.66
As Justice Holmes warned in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.67 when the Supreme Court held that an advertisement
for a circus was copyrightable:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At
the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation.... At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.68
III. IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY

A.

No Copyrightfor Ideas

An axiom of copyright law is that copyright protection does not
extend to ideas. 69 Rather, copyright protects only an artist's original
expression of those ideas.7" The reason ideas are not protected by
copyright is that doing so would thwart the purpose of copyright to

64. Id.

65. Id. ("[Ilf a work might arguably be regarded as a work of art by any meaningful segment
of the population, be they high-brow, low-brow, hippy, avant-garde, middle class-bourgeois, adult
or juvenile, then the work must be considered a work of art for copyright purposes."); see also
supra text accompanying notes 13-16 (discussing the broad definition of a work of art in
copyright).
66. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08[B][1].
67. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
68. Id. at 251-52; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) ("Individual perception
of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art."); Pellegrini v.
Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924) ("It is clear enough that a comparison is not to be made
between the two works of art, with a view to determine their relative artistic merit. Such a
judgment would not be a judicial one. Even if rendered, it might not be of much value. 'De
gustibus non disputandum' is a truth now of ancient vintage, but none the less remains a truth.").
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea ...

concept, [or] principle, ...

regardless of the form in

which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) ("[N]o author may copyright ...
ideas.").
70. Id. at 547 ("The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work-termed 'expression'
). This
.....principle is often referred to as the "idea/expression dichotomy." See, e.g., id. at
556.
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"promote the Progress of Science."'" Copyright law promotes this purpose
by encouraging artists, in exchange for a monopoly on their expression, to
communicate their ideas and knowledge to the world." Once the ideas are
available, other artists are free to build upon the ideas embodied in the
work,73 which results in the "intellectual advancement of mankind."74 If,
on the other hand, the use of ideas constituted copyright infringement,
copyright would have the opposite effect.75 Given the duration of copyright
today,76 the impact on artistic innovation from the monopolization of ideas
would be severe.
Although it is well-established that copyright protection is limited to
original expression,77 identifying the idea and the expression of the idea in
a work and determining whether another artist has copied the expression is
a difficult task. Judge Learned Hand is often cited for recognizing the
challenge: "[N]o principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the idea, and has borrowed its expression."78 He further
noted that with regard to visual works: "[T]he test is, if possible, even
more intangible."79 For example, going back to the artist painting the Tree
of Life,8" another artist would be free to see the painting and also decide to
paint the Tree of Life-this is copying the idea of the painting. However,
the difficult question is what aspects of the painting are unprotected ideas
and what constitutes original expression? Can the imitator, who has seen
the other artist's painting, paint the tree the same size? From the same
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The First Amendment also requires that ideas not be protected by copyright. See
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 582.
72. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[B][2][a] ("Indeed, it has been said that
copyright protection is granted for the very reason that it may persuade authors to make their
ideas freely accessible to the public so that they may be used for the intellectual advancement of
mankind.").
73. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) ("Where the truths of a science or
the methods of an art are the common property of the whole world, any author has the right to
express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own way.").
74. 4 NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[B][2][a].
75. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 ("The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful
arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object
would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book.").
76. Generally, copyright lasts for the life of an artist plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(2000). For more detailed information on the duration of copyright for various works, see
Gasaway, supra note 8.
77. See, e.g., Baker, 101 U.S. at 105 ("The description of the art in the book, though entitled
to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself.").
78. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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angle? At the same time of day? With the same accoutrement, such as
birds or tourists?8 Despite this difficulty, it is imperative that courts
properly distinguish ideas from the expression of those ideas because doing
so has serious implications for the ability of an artist to protect her work.82
B.

MergerDoctrine

The enforcement and application of the idea/expression dichotomy
becomes even more difficult when there is only one way or a very limited
number of ways in which an artist can express an idea. If it is impossible
or nearly impossible to convey an idea without using certain forms of
expression, the "merger doctrine" applies and expression that normally
would be protected is not.83 The doctrine is so named because when the
idea and its expression are so inseparable that to protect the expression
necessarily protects the idea, they are said to "merge." ' To use a wellknown, albeit non-natural works example, an artist who depicts the
Annunciation85 would almost certainly include the winged angel Gabriel
81. In natural works cases, many courts break the work down into its constituent elements
and label each part as idea or expression. Usually, the depiction of the natural element itself-the
Tree of Life, for example-is identified as the idea and the choices made in how to depict the
natural element-size, angle, background-as the expression. See, e.g., Dyer v. Napier, No. CIV
04-0408-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 2730747, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006). Situations in which this
practice and classification can be problematic are discussed infra Part VI.
82. See infra Part VI.C
83. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[B][3]; see also Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) ("When the idea and its expression
are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression in
such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the
conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition to
the merger doctrine, the related doctrine of scones t faire is sometimes applied in natural works
cases. According to scones 6faire, certain elements commonly used in the depiction of a subject
or theme are not protected because they naturally flow from the subject or theme. See Psihoyos v.
Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y 2005); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 1372 ("[s]tandard or general themes that are common to a wide
variety of works and are therefore not copyrightable"). Because the use of these elements is
obvious or commonplace, an artist is not expressing the theme or subject in an original way. See
Psihoyos, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 274; see also id. at 275 (stating that the use of sand as a background
for a photograph of a fossil was subject to scones afaire because it was "the obvious choice of
background for the Fossil"); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 140,
145-46 (D. Mass. 2000) (applying scones 6 faire to the use of a cone of vanilla ice cream to
depict the idea of vanilla), affd Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 32
(1st Cir. 2001). Scknes ii faire will not be discussed further in this Comment because it is not
utilized that frequently in natural works cases, at least compared to the merger doctrine.
85. The Annunciation, a popular subject in Renaissance art, see JAMES HALL, DICTIONARY
OF SUBJECTS & SYMBOLISM INART 18-20 (1974); Susan van Rohr Scaff, The Virgin Annunciate
in Italian Art of the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance, C. LITERATURE, Summer 2002, at 109, is
the important event in Christianity when the angel Gabriel tells the Virgin Mary she is pregnant
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kneeling before a haloed Virgin Mary.86 In such a situation, protecting the
expression (a kneeling, winged Gabriel and haloed Mary) would grant a
monopoly of the idea (the Annunciation) because it would be nearly
impossible to depict the Annunciation without these elements. Therefore,
all artists are free to use this expression to depict the Annunciation.87
Although it may seem unfair to prevent an artist from protecting her
original expression, this result is both statutorily and constitutionally
required. 8
Similar to separating an idea from the expression of that idea, the
merger doctrine can be difficult to apply in practice. One problematic
issue-and a point on which courts vary-is how limited the range of
available expression must be before the doctrine can be invoked. Some
courts apply the doctrine if there are a very limited number of ways to
express an idea, and some courts will only apply it when there is one way
to express the idea.89 Additionally, courts disagree on whether merger is
applicable to the question of copyrightability or infringement. 90
The idea/expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine play a very
important and practical role in copyright by ensuring that protection is
extended only when it will promote the advancement of the arts. 9' For the
purposes of this Comment and natural works, they are most relevant to
with Jesus. Luke 1:26:31 (King James) ("[T]he angel Gabriel was sent from God, unto a city of
Galilee, named Nazareth ... [t]o a virgin ... name~d] Mar..... And the angel said unto her...
though shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus.").
86. See, e.g., Fra Angelico, The Annunciation (1440-45), reprinted in GARDNER'S ART
THROUGH THE AGES 600 (Fred S. Kleiner & Christin J. Mamiya eds., 12th ed. 2005) [hereinafter
GARDNER'S]; Robert Campin, Mdrode Altarpiece (c. 1425-28), reprinted in GARDNER'S, supra,
at 560.
87. A great deal of variable expression, however, remains in depicting the Annunciation,
such as clothing, facial expression, and background, and a painting that copied expression not
required to portray the Annunciation could be infringing. See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater
Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The merger doctrine does not, however, allow the
identical reproduction .... ").
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 540 (1985); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[B][3] ("[G]iven the
dilemma of either protecting original expression.., or of making the idea free to all ... copyright
law chooses the latter course.").
89. Compare Yankee Candle, 259 F.3d at 36 n.6 ("[A]II that is required for application of the
merger doctrine is that there be a sharply limited number of choices."), with Skyy Spirits, 225
F.3d at 1082 ("[C]ourts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the idea
underlying the copyrighted work can be expressed in only one way .. " (emphasis added)).
90. Compare Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d at 1082 ("[C]ourts will not protect a copyrighted work
from infringement if the idea underlying the copyrighted work can be expressed in only one way
....
(emphasis
.
added)), with Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 407 (5th
Cir. 2001) ("In this circuit, the merger doctrine has been applied to the question of whether a
work was copyrightable ... rather than as an infringement defense .... ).
91. The monopolization of an idea for at least seventy years does not promote creation. See
supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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determining the level of copyright protection given a particular work.
Contrary to what one might think, copyright is not all-or-nothing. Rather,
there is a spectrum of protection.92
If a work comprises mostly
unprotectable ideas or facts or has very little originality or creativity, the
protection afforded it is "thin."93 Conversely, "works in which fairly
complex or fanciful artistic expressions predominate ...and which are
almost entirely products of the author's creativity" receive the "strongest"
protection.94 Additionally, the idea/expression dichotomy and the merger
doctrine play a significant role in the substantial similarity analysis because
similarity between ideas and expression necessary to depicting those ideas
cannot be a basis for finding two works substantially similar.95
IV.

SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

A plaintiff in an action for copyright infringement must show both the
ownership of a valid copyright and the copying of protected elements of the
work.96 The copying does not have to be conscious and deliberate but
"'may be the result of subconscious memory derived from hearing, seeing
or reading the copyrighted work at some time in the past.' ,,97Absent
copying, however, there is no infringement because even if the two works
are identical, the later work is not infringing if it is the product of
independent creation.98 In addition to proving that copying in fact
occurred,9 9 a plaintiff must prove that her work and the defendant's work
92. See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.
1982).
93. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). For an example
of a natural works case where a court held the copyright in a photograph was thin because it
depicted mostly unprotected ideas, see Dyer v. Napier, No. CIV 04-0408-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL
2730747, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006).
94. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617. The natural works discussed at the beginning of this Comment
would likely be characterized as works qualifying for the strongest protection. See supra notes 27 and accompanying text.
95. See infra Part V.
96. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER,supra note 10, § 13.01.
97. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cit. 1971)

(quoting HOWELL'S

COPYRIGHT LAW

129 (4th ed. 1962)).

98. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) ("Others are
free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy."); see also supra text accompanying
notes 41-45 (discussing independent creation).
99. Copying can be proven by direct evidence, such as the defendant admitting she copied
the work. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.01[B]. However, there is rarely direct
evidence that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work, so copying is usually inferred from
circumstantial evidence. Id. Generally, to properly infer that a defendant copied, a plaintiff must
prove "access and 'substantial' similarity." Id.; see also Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937
F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Infringement of copyright may be inferred when it is shown
defendants had access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarities exist as to protectible
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are substantially similar."° If the two works are similar but not similar
enough, the copying is not actionable.'
Courts employ a number of different tests to determine whether two
works are substantially similar."° It is unnecessary for the purposes of this
Comment to describe all of the tests; however, a brief summary of the tests
used in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits will aid in
understanding the cases discussed in Part V.103 The First, Second, Third,
and Fifth Circuits all apply the "ordinary observer test."'" To determine
whether two works are substantially similar, courts in the Second Circuit
consider whether "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard [the works']
aesthetic appeal as the same."'0 5
If a copyrighted work contains
unprotected elements, however, courts in the Second Circuit apply a "more

material."). Substantial similarity in this context is not the same as substantial similarity
discussed in this Part. Substantial similarity in terms of proving a defendant actually copied
means that the similarities between two works are evidence of copying because it is unlikely that
they would exist absent copying. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.01 [B] (referring
to this type of similarity as "probative similarity" (citing Alan Latman, "ProbativeSimilarity" as
Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1187 (1990))); see also ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:2 (2007) (discussing the difference between the two
concepts and also referring to this type of similarity as probative similarity). In regard to natural
works, it can be difficult to prove copying based on circumstantial evidence because a number of
similarities may exist not because one artist copied another but rather because the two works
depict the same element of nature. See, e.g., Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 741 ("Any inference of
copying based upon similar appearance lost much of its strength because both pins were lifelike
representations of a [bee]."). But see Ty v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1175 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding similarity between two bean bag pigs evidence of copying). For example, two
paintings of a sunflower by two different artists with different styles will likely include yellow
petals. Compare Georgia O'Keeffe, A Sunflower from Maggie (1937), reprinted in BARBARA
BUHLER LYNES & RUSSELL BOWMAN, O'KEEFFE'S O'KEEFFES: THE ARTIST'S COLLECTION
illus. 48 (2001), with Vincent Van Gogh, Still Life: Vase with Twelve Sunflowers (1888),
reprinted in INGO F. WALTHER & RAINER METZGER, VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE COMPLETE
PAINTINGS 409 (2001). Because real sunflowers in fact have yellow petals, it is not necessarily
proper to infer that one artist copied the other because they both portray a sunflower with yellow
petals. This dilemma can be further exacerbated when the works at issue involve highly realistic
depictions. See generally Dyer v. Napier, No. CIV 04-0408-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 2730747 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006) (involving a photograph of a mountain lion and a lifelike sculpture of a
mountain lion).
100. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[A].
101. Id.
102. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, §§ 3:1 to 3:4.1 (explaining the test used
in each of the federal circuits).
103. All of the cases in Part V come from one of these circuits.
104. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, at §§ 3:1 to 3:1.4.
105. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see
also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:1.1 [A] (describing the ordinary observer
test).
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discerning ordinary observer" test. 10 6 When this test applies, a court first
removes the unprotected elements of the work from the analysis and then
asks whether an ordinary observer would find the remaining protected
elements substantially similar.0 7 The Third Circuit has adopted the Second
Circuit's approach to determining substantial similarity,"°8 and so has the
Fifth Circuit except for a slight variation."° The First Circuit also applies
an ordinary observer test,"0 but it is more "enthusiastic" about dissecting a
Courts in the First Circuit also
work to remove unprotected elements.'
"apply the doctrines of merger and scMes-ci-faire to determine how
'substantially similar' the copy must be to infringe.""' 2 Finally, after
removing unprotected elements and applying those two doctrines, the court
asks "whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff s work that an
ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully
appropriated the plaintiffs protected expression by taking material of
Finally, the Ninth Circuit uses an
substance and value."' 1 3
"extrinsic/intrinsic" test." 4 The test consists of a two-part analysis. First,
the "extrinsic test" is applied to determine whether the ideas in two works
are substantially similar."5 This is an objective, factual inquiry, and the
court looks at specific criteria, such as "the type of artwork involved, the

106. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:1.1 [B]
(describing the more discerning ordinary observer test).
107. See OSTERBERG &OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:1.1[B].
108. See id. § 3:1.3; see also Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1232 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting adoption of Second Circuit's test in the Third Circuit (citing
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975))); Universal Athletic
Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Second Circuit as source of the test
for substantial similarity in the Third Circuit).
109. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:1.4 (stating that to determine whether
two works are substantially similar in the Fifth Circuit, "a side by side comparison must be made
between the original and the copy to determine whether a layman would view the two works as
'substantially similar' " (quoting Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d. 131, 142 (5th Cir.
2004))).
110. See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); see
also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:1.2 (explaining the substantial similarity test
in the First Circuit).
111. See Yankee Candle, 259 F.3d at 34.
112. Id. (citing Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 609 n.9
(1st Cir. 1988)). For a discussion of scknes-ai-faire, see supra note 84.
113. Id. at 33 (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600,
607 (lst Cir. 1988)); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, at § 3:1.2 (noting this as
the formulation of the ordinary observer test in the First Circuit).
114. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:2.1.
115. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977); OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:2.1 [A].
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materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject.""' 6 If
there is substantial similarity between ideas, then the "intrinsic test" is
applied to determine whether this is also substantial similarity in
expression." 7 The intrinsic test is subjective and determines whether the
"ordinary reasonable person," without considering external criteria or
analytically dissecting the work, would consider the two works
substantially similar."8
Finally, it is important to note that, as a general principle, an alleged
infringer cannot point to minor dissimilarities between two works in order
to avoid an otherwise appropriate finding of substantially similarity: "No
copier may defend the act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the
copy he has not pirated. Thus, where substantial similarity is found, small
changes here and there made by the copier are unavailing.""' 9 This result is
logical considering that the similarity required is substantial and not
identical or nearly identical.
V. NATURAL WORKS CASES

Given the popularity of nature as a subject of art, courts have had
ample opportunity to hear and decide cases dealing with natural works.
The diversity of the type of works at issue and the approach taken to deal
with natural works has resulted in a number of interesting and notable
opinions. This Part surveys a number of these opinions in order to provide
a compilation of cases that highlights the unique copyright issues raised in
natural works cases and to illuminate the importance of accurately
identifying and valuing original artistic expression. Additionally, the cases
discussed below were selected because they provide examples of the kinds
of works that often depict nature, including floral fabric patterns, artificial
flowers, and plant-inspired lamps; realistic animal sculptures, including
taxidermy, hunting decoys, statues, lawn ornaments, and masks; animal
toys; animal jewelry; labels depicting fruit and flowers; and, finally, art as
it is more traditionally defined-paintings, sculptures, and artistic
photographs.
After reviewing these cases and how the court in each resolved such
questions as whether a work was original and creative, what was an idea

116. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. Obviously, the court must take the preliminary
step of distinguishing between ideas and expression. See Dyer v. Napier, No. CIV 04-0408-PHXSMM, 2006 WL 2730747, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG,
supra note 99, at § 3:2. 1[C] (discussing "analytic dissection" in the extrinsic test).
117. See Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163; OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99,
§ 3:2.1[A].
118. See id. at 1164; OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, § 3:2.1 [A].
119. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
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and what was expression, and whether the merger doctrine applied, the
final Part of this Comment will show that if the tools of copyright analysis
are employed without taking adequate account of original artistic
expression, artists who create natural works may be denied the full
protection of U.S. copyright law.
A.

FloralSculpture and Fabric Patterns

In Prestige Floral v. California Artificial Flower Co.,12 ° the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York considered a motion
for a preliminary injunction by a manufacturer of a "molded polyethylene
flower in the form of a Charles lilac" to prevent a competing artificial
flower manufacturer from producing a very similar product. 2 ' In response
to the defendant's attack on the validity of the copyright, the court
considered whether creating artificial flowers was sufficiently artistic to
After citing numerous authorities in
warrant copyright protection.'
support of the principle that only a small amount of originality and
creativity is required for a work to be copyrightable, including cases
discussing natural works,'23 the court concluded that "though a flower... is
a creation of nature, a likeness of it may be copyrighted."' 24 Furthermore,
the court stated that this result was especially proper here because creating
the plastic lilac involved "numerous and detailed decisions as to proportion,
form, contour, configuration, and conformation"'2 5 and a "substantial
degree of skill and independent judgment."'' 2 6 Upon moving to the issue of
infringement, the court quickly concluded that the defendant's lilac was a
copy.

127

A decade after Prestige Floral, the district court considered artificial
flowers again in First American Artificial Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph
Markovits, Inc., 28 which involved "wire and polyethylene plastic
sculptured reproductions of tea roses."'' 29 In its consideration of whether
the two works were substantially similar, the court initially stated that it
would not be proper to infer copying based on a general impression of
120. 201 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
121. Id. at 287-88.
122. See id. at 289.
123. See id. at 289-91.
124. Id. at 291.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 293. There was also strong evidence that the defendant did actually copy the
plaintiffs design. See id. at 288-89.
128. 342 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

129. Id. at 181.
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similarity alone because two works that "represent a natural prototype or
archetype are likely to be similar" even if both were independently
created.130 Comparing the two roses more closely, the court found a
"pattern of differences" sufficient to negate the inference of copying. 3'
Specifically, ignoring similarities dictated by nature,'32 the differences
included the arrangement and placement of the leaves on the stems, the
color and size of the leaves, the distinctiveness of the veins on the leaves,
the color of the petals, and the position and shape of the thorns.'33
Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied." 3
Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp.3 5 concerned whether a banana leaf
design on a lamp was sufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection. 36 The court quickly rejected the argument that a sculpture that
imitates nature is not copyrightable. 31 As for the plaintiffs banana leaf
design, the court held that it clearly surpassed the threshold requirement for
originality because it was more than an imitation of nature: the leaves were
elongated, stylized, and "twist[ed] and intertwine [ed]" in an unnatural
fashion.'
In the end, although the defendant's floor lamps varied slightly
in their shape from the plaintiffs lamps, they were otherwise "slavish and
1
blatant knock-off[s],"' 39
and, thus, infringing.
In Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California,4 ' the Second Circuit
noted the difficulty of determining whether two works are substantially
similar when they both depict the same flower. 4' Folio Impressions

130. Id. at 186. This approach is markedly different from that taken in Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The Peter Pan court found the

defendant's design substantially similar to the plaintiffs "Flower Plaid" design because "the
overall appearance [of the two designs] evokes the striking impression that they are identical."
Id. at 336. The "minor dissimilarities" were disregarded because the court thought they were the
result of defendant's attempts to hide the fact that it had copied the plaintiff's design. Id.
131. See FirstAm. Artificial Flowers, 342 F. Supp. at 186-87.

132. See id. at 186 ("[B]oth roses possess two topmost leaves composed of three leaflets each;
the next lower leaf ...or leaves ... are composed of five leaflets .... From our experience we

note that the rose as it commonly appears in nature contains three leaflets on each of the two
leaves closest to each major bud, and five leaflets on all other leaves.").
133. See id. at 186-87.
134. Id. at 188.
135. 698 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
136. Id. at 1151.
137. Id. (citing a "roll call of mundane and imitative objects that have qualified for copyright
protection").
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1152-53 ("The background and portrayal of the leaves is exactly the same, as is
the over-all shape of the lamps ....
").
140. 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
141.

See id.at 766.
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involved two similar fabric patterns, each with a common background1 42
and roses aligned in a straight line. 43 The court first held that the
arrangement of plaintiff's "Folio Roses" in a straight line was
copyrightable because it was original and creative.'
However, it
circumscribed the copyright and protected only the Folio Rose arranged in
a straight line, as opposed to any rose arranged in a straight line, because
otherwise the plaintiff would have a monopoly over the idea of arranging
roses in a straight line.'45 Turning to infringement, 4 6 the court held the
roses themselves were not substantially similar because the pattern and the
focus differed.147 Regarding the obvious similarities between the two
designs, the court reasoned: "[T]hough playwrights and poets from
William Shakespeare to Gertrude Stein have extolled the beauty of this
five-petaled flower, by the rose's very nature one artist's rendering of it
1 48
will closely resemble another artist's work."
The Second Circuit, however, quickly limited the applicability of
Folio Impressions in cases involving floral fabric designs when it decided
Hamil America, Inc. v. GFI.'49 Again, the court was faced with very
similar floral fabric designs, this time consisting of "clusters of small white
and yellow flowers with blue centers on a red background." 5 ' The court,
however, refused to dissect the design and compare only certain elements
because it decided that the more discerning observer standard applied in
Folio Impressions..1 is not triggered by the presence of elements of nature,

142. The background, however, was in the public domain, so it was irrelevant whether the
defendant used it. See id.
143. Id. at764.
144. Id. at 765 (stating that the decision to arrange the roses in "straight rows was an artistic
decision" and that it was the designer's "original work").
145. Id. The court did not discuss whether the Folio Rose itself, as opposed to the
arrangement, was sufficiently original or creative. Rather, it accepted it as copyrightable because
it was registered with the U.S. Copyright Office and no evidence was introduced at trial to dispute
the validity of the copyright. See id. at 763.
146. The court considered only whether the defendant's "Baroque Rose" was substantially
similar to the Folio Rose and did not analyze the similarity between the background and the
arrangement for the reasons mentioned above-public domain background and no protection for
the idea of arranging roses in a straight line.
147. Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 766. In finding these small variations sufficient to defeat
a claim of substantial similarity, the court applied a "more discerning 'ordinary observer' test"
where the unprotected elements (background, straight line) were ignored. Id. at 765-66.
148. Id. at 766. Unlike in Prestige Floral, see supra note 127, there was "considerable
evidence" in Folio Impressions that the Baroque Rose was independently created. Id.
149. 193 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1999).
150. Id. at 96.
151. See supra note 147.
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but rather by design components in the public domain.' 52 Furthermore, the
court adopted the view, similar to that in Sunset Lamp,'53 that because the
flowers were stylized and unique rather than precise reproductions of real
flowers, they were clearly protected expression and should not be
154
withdrawn from consideration during the substantial similarity analysis.
Considering the design as a whole, the court then found the defendant's
design infringing. 5
A few patterns emerge in these opinions on two- and threedimensional representations of flowers and plants in fabric patterns, plastic
sculptures, and lamps. First, originality in representations of nature is
acknowledged, and the argument that realistic depictions of flowers and
plants are not copyrightable per se is rightly rejected. The originality
requirement is low and a sculpture or drawing of a flower or leaf will
almost always contain more than de minimus creativity. In Sunset Lamp
and Hamil America, however, the court noted that the result was partly
driven by the fact that the works involved stylized rather than realistic
representations of nature. Although an artistic choice to stylize an element
of nature certainly is relevant because it is original expression that another
artist cannot copy freely, a work of art should not be more deserving of
protection because it is a fanciful representation of nature. As recognized
in Prestige Floral,even realistic depictions of flowers contain a great deal
of original expression.
B.

Taxidermy and Decoys

It is not surprising that it can be difficult to prove infringement when
the works at issue are taxidermy mannequins' 56 and hunting decoys'57
because these works by their very nature and purpose are meant to look as
realistic as possible. In Streeter v. Rolfe, 5 ' the defendant asked the
plaintiff, a taxidermist, to design a "lightweight wild turkey decoy," as well
as the molds to mass produce the decoy.' 59 When the business relationship
fell apart and the defendant designed another decoy and set of molds, the

152. See Hamil Am., 193 F.3d at 101. Again, the background of the pattern at issue in Folio
Impressions was in the public domain. See supra note 142.
153. See text accompanying note 138.
154. HamilAm., 193 F.3d at 101.
155. See id. at 102-03.
156. A taxidermy mannequin is the model on which the animal skin is mounted. See Hart v.
Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 1996).
157. A hunting decoy is "an artificial bird used by hunters to attract live birds (as water fowl)
within shot."

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 588 (1993)

(defining "decoy").
158. 491 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. La. 1980).
159. Id. at417.
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plaintiff sued for copyright infringement." 6 In finding the two decoys not
substantially similar, the court held that the defendant copied only the idea
of a turkey decoy and not the plaintiffs original expression.16' The court
further noted that the decoys must be similar because they must both
resemble a real turkey "or they would be useless,"' 162 and insofar as the
decoys could differ, they did.1 63 Lastly, the court adopted an approach
similar to that taken by a few other courts"6 when dealing with highly
realistic natural works: "[R]efus[al] to find a copyright infringement
absent a finding that the defendant made an exact copy of plaintiffs
likeness.'

65

Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co. 166 presented the Second
Circuit with the question: Once you have "seen one fish mannequin," have
you "seen them all"? 67 The court did not reach the answer, 68 but it did say
that if "all realistic fish mannequins, no matter how artistic they might be,
will necessarily be substantially similar," then no fish mannequin can be69
copyrighted because the idea and expression have merged completely.
On remand, the district court rejected the plaintiff's argument that there is
an endless number of ways to express a lifelike fish 7 ° and concluded that
the only element of the fish mannequin not necessitated by the idea 7' was
the "cant or swish" of the tail; 72 however, there was an extremely limited
number of ways to design the tail. Therefore, the district court held that
there are so few ways to express a realistic fish mannequin that the merger

160. Id. at417,419-20.
161. See id. at 420-21.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 421 (noting that the "fullness" of the necks, tails, and bodies was different).
164. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 186, 251.
165. Id. (emphasis added). The court acknowledged that the defendant's decoy was not the
result of independent creation. However, it still found the decoy noninfringing because people
can "use, not only all that ha[s] gone before, but even the plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they
[draw] from it only the more general patterns; that is, if they [keep] clear of its 'expression.' " Id.
(quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)).
166. 86 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1996).
167. Id. at 323.
168. Id. at 323 (remanding the question to the district court).
169. See id. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 967 F. Supp. 70, 72 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("For
example, a large mouth bass could be eighteen inches long and twelve inches in girth, or sixteen
inches long with a fourteen inch girth. Further, a bass could be swimming with its tail to the left,
or with its tail up, jumping with a right turn, 'sipping' or feeding on insects, or many other
'poses.' "), aff'd Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 152 F.3d 918, 918 (2d Cir. 1998).
171. The court defined the idea as the creation of "a form, that when mounted with the skin
and head of a fish carcass, gives the appearance of a 'life-like' fish." Id.
172. Id. at 72-73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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doctrine precluded it from being copyrighted.'73
Taxidermy mannequins and hunting decoys are probably the most
troublesome natural works. Two mannequins or decoys will likely be very
similar because they are meant to be realistic, and their function limits the
ways in which an artist can depict the animal. The merger doctrine will
apply to many aspects of the work, and small dissimilarities may be
significant in the substantial similarity analysis. There are, however,
different ways of expressing a particular mannequin or decoy, as the courts
in both Streeter and Hart acknowledged. Therefore, these works should
not be denied copyright protection for lack of originality; deciding how to
sculpt the tail of a fish mannequin, for example, should count as a creative
spark.
C. Other Realistic Animal Sculpture
In F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.,174 the often-cited
dog-in-the-show-position case, 175 the First Circuit upheld a finding of
infringement' 7 6 for a sculpture entitled "Cocker-spaniel in show
position."' 177 The court first separated the artist's unprotected expression
from the idea and found that the show position stance was an idea free for
anyone to replicate.178 Conversely, the artists' expression was "the
proportion, form, contour, configuration, and conformation, perhaps the
latter in details too subtle for appreciation by anyone but a fancier, of the
The defendant's
dog represented by the sculptured work of art."'
idea of a dog
copying
the
sculpture was infringing because it went beyond
in a show position and "embod[ied] the identical intellectual or artistic
conception."' 80 Differences between the two sculptures were discounted
because they were likely the result8 of the defendant altering a mold made
from one of the plaintiff's statues.' '
173. Id. at 73. The court of appeals affirmed because the district court's opinion was not
clearly erroneous, and "[w]hile it is possible that artists (and maybe even judges) might divine
nuanced differences in the expressiveness of the tail angle of the various mounts, it is not our job,
as an appellate court, to get into a debate over the essence of fishness." Hart v. Dan Chase
Taxidermy Supply Co., 152 F.3d 918, 918 (2d Cir. 1998).
174. 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951).
175. See, e.g., Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
176. F.W. Woolworth, 193 F.2d at 169.
177. Id. at 163.
178. Id. at 164 ("[Slhow position in a dog is a standardized, stylized position which anyone is

free to reproduce.").
179. Id. at 164-66.
180. Id. at 165.
181. Id. at 165-66 (stating that the fact that the defendant's dog had long hair while the
plaintiff's dog had short hair was insignificant because the defendant likely made a mold from the
plaintiff's statue and then carved wavy lines into it).
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Several decades later, the First Circuit was confronted with similar
issues in Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc.,82 in

which the works at issue were "molds to make concrete statues and
ornamental articles, such as swans, donkeys, deer, and urns, used primarily
for lawn decorations."' 183 The opinion naturally included a discussion of the
merger doctrine, and the court stated that it would apply the merger
doctrine to situations in which "there is essentially only one way to express
an idea."'" In circumstances where there is more than one way to express
an idea, but the ability to express the idea remains limited, the court will
not completely remove the bar on copying.'85 It will, however, require the
plaintiff to show "near identity" between the works. 86 In Concrete
Machinery, the idea was "a realistic-looking concrete deer," and the court
stated that all artists are free to use the features inherent to a real deer in
making their realistic concrete deer.'87 The protected, original expression
included any discretionary features, such as the "pose, posture, and facial
expression."' 88 Ultimately, the court decided that realistic concrete deer
statues were "subject to diverse expression" 18 9-so the merger doctrine did
not apply-and remanded the case to determine whether the defendant
copied protected expression. 9 °
In MasqueradeNovelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 9 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit concerned itself primarily with whether
"masks configured to resemble the noses of a pig, elephant, and a parrot"'9 2
were copyrightable or if they were precluded from protection as useful
articles.' 93 Although the court of appeals did not reach the issue of
182. 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988).
183. Id. at 603.
184. Id. at 606.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 609 ("Even the various animal representations, while lifelike and allowing of fewer
possibilities, are nonetheless somewhat stylized versions of these creatures in terms of posture
and facial expression.").
190. Id. at 611.
191. 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990).
192. Id. at 664.
193. Copyrightability was not at issue because the masks were unoriginal. Rather, the district
court had ruled that the masks were useful articles "allowing people to humorously masquerade
as humans with an animal feature." See id. at 667. Useful articles as such are not copyrightable.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 40: COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATION FOR WORKS OF THE VISUAL ARTS 2 (July 2006), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ40.pdf ("Copyright does not protect the mechanical or utilitarian aspects
of [useful articles]."). The court in Masquerade Novelty held that the masks were copyrightable.
Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 671.
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infringement,'" it noted that on remand, proving infringement may be
difficult because both masks "are relatively straightforward representations
of animal noses."' 95 To prove infringement, the plaintiff would need to
show that similarities were the result of copying rather than simply the
result of depicting the same animal's nose.'96 The plaintiff did meet its
burden on remand. After finding that the plaintiff's masks did not merely
97
replicate a real animal nose but were instead humorous interpretations,'
the district court held that the defendant's masks copied the "artistic
elements and flourishes" of the plaintiffs pig, elephant, and parrot
masks,1 9 and the defendant was found liable for infringement.' 99
The opinions discussed above correctly acknowledge that realistic
animal sculpture can contain a great deal of original artistic expression.
The court in F. W. Woolworth and Concrete Machinery recognized that
even when artists represent animals realistically, they make numerous
artistic choices, and these choices can result in protected original
expression. Although the reasoning in Masquerade Novelty suggests that
the result may have been different if the masks were lifelike representations
of animal noses, the case is still a good example, like the other two cases,
of a court carefully examining a natural work for original artistic
expression and not assuming that all of the expression is necessitated by the
idea of depicting a particular animal.
D. Toys
In Rushton Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.2" the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York had to decide whether the faces of two
stuffed chimpanzee dolls were substantially similar.2 °' Although experts
testified that the dolls' faces "bear striking resemblances, 2 2 the court
noted many "significant" dissimilarities.2 3 In regard to the allegedly
infringing doll, the
face is larger; its cheek bone area is higher; the distance from its
nose to the tip of the upper lip is longer; the expanse of its lips from
end to end is larger; the shape of its mouth opening is different; the
194. Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 671.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 671-72.

197. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., No. 89-6926, 1990 WL 209320, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 1990).
198. See id. at *4-5.
199. Id. at *7.

200.
201.
202.
203.

135 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Id. at319.
Id. at 32 1.
Id.
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curvature of the upper lip is different; and, viewed sideways, the
contours and profile of the face are different.2"'
The court reasoned that the similarities which did exist were likely the
result of the fact that the artists used "the same source of materials: live
chimpanzees, photographs of chimpanzees, and [famous chimpanzees on
television]."205
Therefore, the court held the defendant's doll was
noninfringing.2 °6
The Ninth Circuit made clear in the case of Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co.2" 7
that it grants copyright protection to stuffed animals that are realistic
depictions of live animals, yet carefully tailors the scope of the
protection. z 8 The works at issue in Aliotti were two lines of stuffed toy
dinosaurs-the plaintiffs "Ding-A-Saur" line and the defendant's
"Prehistoric Pet" line. 2°9 The court of appeals upheld summary judgment
for the defendant because there were numerous dissimilarities between the
two lines: The Ding-A-Saurs were "sleepy eyed ... with exaggerated
facial and other anatomical features" while the Prehistoric Pets were "more
accurate depictions of dinosaurs" and "reflect[ed] less personality. 'z0
Furthermore, many of the similarities between the two lines were a result of
the "physiognomy of dinosaurs," and, thus, could not be given weight in
the substantial similarity analysis due to the merger doctrine.2 '
Judge Posner did not assume that similarities between two bean bag
pigs were the result of both toys depicting a real animal in Ty, Inc. v. GMA
Accessories, Inc.21 2 Ty, the manufacturer of Beanie Babies, obtained a
preliminary injunction against a retailer to prevent the sale of a bean bag
pig (Preston the Pig) because it allegedly infringed Ty's bean bag pig
(Squealer).2 3 On appeal, the court of appeals was primarily concerned

204. Id. at 321-22.
205. Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Id. at 325-26. There were actually two dolls at issue, and the other was found to be
infringing primarily because of evidence it was made from a copy of the plaintiff's doll mold. Id.
207. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
208. In a previous case that involved stuffed toy animals, the Ninth Circuit quickly rejected
the argument that realistic depictions of live animals are never copyrightable. See Kamar Int'l,
Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Anyone can copyright anything,
if he adds something original to its expression.").
209. See id. at 899-900. Both lines included a Brontosaurus, Stegosaurus, Triceratops,
Tyrannosaurus Rex, Pterodactyl, and Woolly Mammoth. See id.
210. Id. at 900 (quoting Order Granting Summary Judgment at 2-3, No. 84-20368 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 29, 1986)).
211. See id. at 901 ("No copyright protection may be afforded the idea of producing stuffed
dinosaur toys or to elements of expression that necessarily follow from the idea of such dolls.").
212. 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
213. Id. at 1169; see also id. at 1174 (picture of the two toys).
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with whether the two toys were so similar-strikingly similar-that the
plaintiff need not independently prove the defendant had access to the
work.2 4 The court acknowledged that it is not proper to forgo independent
proof of access if the similarity between the two works could be the result
of both depicting something in the public domain, such as two photographs
of Niagara Falls, 2t5 but reasoned that this was not the case here:
[Preston the Pig] is strikingly similar to [Squealer] but not to
anything in the public domain-a real pig, for example ....

The

parties' bean-bag pigs bear little resemblance to real pigs even if we
overlook the striking anatomical anomaly of Preston-he has three
toes, whereas real pigs have cloven hooves. We can imagine an
argument that the technology of manufacturing bean-bag animals
somehow prevents the manufacturer from imitating a real pig. But
anyone even slightly familiar with stuffed animals knows that there
are many lifelike stuffed pigs on the market, and whether they are
stuffed with beans or other materials does not significantly affect
their verisimilitude ...

216

Therefore, the court of appeals upheld the preliminary injunction.
Cases that involve stuffed animals reveal a number of important
points. First, just because a court recognizes the original expression in a
stuffed animal does not mean it will find that another artist has copied that
expression. The Rushton court acknowledged the varying ways in which
an artist could represent a chimpanzee's face when it detailed the
differences between the two toys, but because the artists each used
distinctive expression in creating the toy, they were not substantially
similar. Second, defendants should not be allowed to hide behind the fact
that similarities usually exist between two works that depict the same
animal when that does not explain the similarities. As Judge Posner
noticed in Ty, the defendant's bean bag pig did not look like a real pig, but
it did look like the plaintiff's bean bag pig.

214. When direct evidence of copying is absent, copying can be inferred if the plaintiff can
prove access and substantial similarity. See supra note 99. However, if the two works are
strikingly similar, a plaintiff may not have to prove access separately because "similarity that is
so close as to be highly unlikely to have been an accident of independent creation is evidence of
access." Ty, 132 F.3d at 1170.
215. See id. at ll70.
216. Id.; see also id. at 1175 (picture of real pigs).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

E. Jewelry and Candles
Two frequently cited and important natural works cases that do not
quite fit into the other categories are Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian2" 7 and Yankee Candle Co. v. BridgewaterCandle Co.2 '

Kalpakian involved "pin[s] in the shape of a bee formed of gold
encrusted with jewels."2 9 In this case, the court reasoned that substantial
similarity between the two bee pins did not enable a legitimate inference of
copying because the similarity was likely due to both pins being "lifelike
representations of a natural creature."22 The court, however, admitted that
the defendants may have copied the pin because the defendants, who were
" ' and because copying "may
jewelers, had access to the plaintiff's bee pin,22
'
However, defining the idea as a
be the result of subconscious memory."222
"jeweled bee pin," the court stated that the idea and the expression were
indistinguishable because the similarity between the bee pins was
inevitable. 2 3 Thus, the court ultimately held that even if the defendants
had copied the bee pin, the merger doctrine allowed it.2 4
Yankee Candle involved the application of the merger doctrine to
candle jar labels depicting fruit and flowers. 225 Both parties manufactured
candles that smelled like various fruits and flowers, such as cranberry,
peach, apple, gardenia, mulberry, and raspberry. 226 Naturally, the labels

217. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
218. 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
219. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 739.
220. Id. at 741. The court also noted that there were differences between the two bee pins,
"notably in the veining of the wings." Id.
221. Id. (stating that the plaintiffs bee pin was "highly successful").
222. Id. (quoting HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW 129 (4th ed. 1962)).
223. See id. at 742 ("When the idea and its expression are thus inseparable, copying the
expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression in such circumstances would confer
a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
224. A few years after Kalpakian, the parties found themselves in court again. This time, the
work at issue was a jeweled gold turtle pin. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora
Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 64 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam). The Second Circuit also found the
defendant's pin noninfringing because most of the similarities between the pins resulted from the
fact that they both depicted a turtle:
Although the oval arrangement of 10 gems might at first blush appear to possess
individuality of expression, further observation discloses that it merely conforms to the
normal shape of the turtle's back and the pattern of its vertebrae segments, of which
there are in nature not less than 10 nor more than 12.
See id. at 65-66.
225. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001).
226. Id. at 32 n.1 (citing Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 140,
148-50 (D. Mass. 2000)).
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contained images of the fruits and flowers that inspired the scents. 227 To
determine whether the labels were substantially similar, the First Circuit
proceeded first to "dissect" the labels to remove unprotected elements228
and apply the merger doctrine to see "how substantially similar the copy
must be to infringe. ' 229 The merger doctrine as applied by this court was
quite robust. The merger doctrine applied (and copying was allowed) when
the only way to express the idea of the fruits and flowers was to depict their
likeness or when there were "sharply" limited choices of subject matter.230
Merger applied even if the subject matter "expressed more subtle ideas
open to greater possibilities of representation. 2 3' Moreover, the court
reasoned that the merger doctrine was particularly applicable when the
work depicted nature.232 The only limitation the court placed on this
reasoning was that the merger doctrine would not sanction actual identical
reproduction of an image if it had some original elements. 233 The court
ultimately concluded that the merger doctrine applied to the labels because
"there were few associated expressions, of which the most obvious was a
realistic representation of the fruit or flower at issue. '"234 Thus, after
describing the differences in the labels at length, 235 the court decided that
once the unprotected elements were removed and the merger doctrine
applied, the labels were not substantially similar.236
As will be discussed in detail in Part VI, Kalpakian and Yankee
Candle exemplify what happens when original artistic expression is
undervalued and the merger doctrine is applied too vigorously. Although
certain features of a pin designed to look like a bee are subject to the
merger doctrine, the entire work is not preordained by the anatomy of a
227. Id. at 36.
228. Id. at 34-35 (finding the "full-bleed photo[graphy]" and rectangular gold border
unprotected).
229. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court dismissed the argument that
dissection was improper because dissection resulted in undervaluing the original expression
involved in the selection and arrangement of the unprotected elements. Id. ("This court ... has
been more enthusiastic ... about the use of dissection analysis to disaggregate a visual work into
its component elements for the purpose of removing the unprotectible elements contained
within.").
230. See id. at 35-36 & n.6.
231. Id. at 35.
232. id. at 36 ("[T]he merger doctrine is most applicable where the idea and the expression
are of items found in nature.").
233. Id. at 36 ("If Bridgewater had scanned Yankee's labels into a computer and reproduced
them exactly, it would have certainly infringed Yankee's copyrights on those labels.").
234. Id.
235. Id. at 37 n.7. For example, Bridgewater's cranberry-scented candle jar label depicted
cranberries alone while Yankee's label had fewer cranberries and green leaves; Bridgewater's
mulberry-scented candle jar label had redder mulberries; and Yankee's raspberry-scented candle
jar label had more leaves. Id.
236. Id. at 37.
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bee. Moreover, an image of a fruit or flower is admittedly the most
obvious choice for how to visually represent its scent, but there still
remains an almost endless variety of ways to represent the fruit or flower
itself.
F.

'
Art "within the historicaland ordinary conception of the term art"237

This Comment would be incomplete without a discussion of cases
involving "art" in the traditional sense of the word.238 Although some may
find it easy to dismiss as unimportant the copying of a fake turkey or
plastic flower because it does not seriously undermine the advancement of
the arts, what about those works arguably thought of as the most rigorously
protected?
239
Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc.
involved two watercolor paintings of cardinals sitting on the branches of an
apple tree in blossom. 2 4 The court preliminarily stated that copyright in
works of art that depict their subject matter with "photograph-like clarity
and accuracy 241 is " 'weak,' "242 and artists who create such works will
find it difficult to prove unlawful copying. 43 In regard to the cardinal
paintings, the court noted that many of the similarities between the two
works were unavoidable because in ornithological art, "minute attention to
detail of plumage and other physical characteristics is required and the
stance of the birds must be anatomically correct." 244 There were, however,
a number of dissimilarities between the two paintings. 45 Although there

237. Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633,635 (9th Cir.1953).
238. The Oxford English Dictionarydefines art as "[tihe application of skill to the arts of...
painting, engraving, sculpture, [and] architecture" or the "skilful production of the beautiful in
visible forms." I THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 657 (2d ed. 1989) (noting also that "[t]his
is the most usual modem sense of art, when used without any qualification"). This section
includes photography because the photograph in the case discussed was a carefully crafted image
and not just a snapshot.
239. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
240. Id. at 64. The two works at issue in Franklin Mint were created by the same artist.
National Wildlife Art Exchange hired the artist to paint Cardinals on Apple Blossom, and the
company owned the copyright in the painting. Franklin Mint Corporation subsequently hired the
artist to paint The Cardinal,the allegedly infringing work. Id. at 63-64.
241. Id. at 65.
242. Id. (quoting First Am. Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, 342 F. Supp. 178, 186
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
243. See id. (contrasting highly realistic paintings with impressionist paintings, such as
Monet's studies of Rouen Cathedral, for which "infringement attempts [are] difficult").
244. See id. at 66.
245. See id. (describing the differences between the two paintings, such as differences in
color, posture, position, placement, and expression of the birds, foliage, and general composition).
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was "strong circumstantial evidence of copying,"246 the court of appeals
deferred to the trial court's determination that the artist did not copy, 247 and
stated that even if he had copied, only ideas, and not expression, were
used. 24 ' Because the expression of the idea of cardinals on a blossoming
apple tree branch differed in the two paintings, the defendant's work was
found noninfringing.249
In Satava v. Lowry, 25 ° the Ninth Circuit concluded that a glass-in-glass
sculpture of lifelike jellyfish "possesse[d] a thin copyright that protects
against only virtually identical copying."25' The plaintiff was inspired to
create the sculptures after attending a jellyfish exhibit at an aquarium, and
his rendition was extraordinarily realistic.252 The defendant began creating
glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures after seeing a picture of plaintiff's work,
and his sculptures were remarkably similar. 253 The plaintiff, however, was
unable to prevent this blatant copying because the court found that his
sculpture consisted of "unprotectable ideas and standard elements," and his
selection and arrangement of the elements was not original.254 The court
reasoned that there was no protection for "the idea of producing a glass-inglass jellyfish sculpture or to elements of expression that naturally follow
from the idea of such a sculpture," and the plaintiff could "not prevent
others from copying aspects of his sculptures resulting from ...jellyfish
physiology, '' 21 such as tendril-like tentacles, rounded bells, or bright
colors.25 6 The court did not go so far as to deny copyright protection for all
realistic depictions of animals, but justified its holding as follows:
Nature gives us ideas of animals in their natural surroundings:
an eagle with talons extended to snatch a mouse; a grizzly bear
clutching a salmon between its teeth; a butterfly emerging from its
cocoon; a wolf howling at the full moon; a jellyfish swimming
through tropical waters. These ideas, first expressed by nature, are
246. Id. The artist, who painted both works, obviously had access to the previous work, and
the two paintings were similar. See id.
247. Id. at 66-67.
248. Id. at 67. The court also explained that an artist cannot use copyright to monopolize an
entire subject matter, concept, or theme. See id. at 65, 66.
249. Id. at 66.
250. 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
251. Id. at812.
252. See id. at 807-08.
253. Id. at 808-09 (including pictures of the two sculptures).
254. Id. at 811.
255. Id. at 810. The Ninth Circuit, however, did, acknowledge that artistic choices "not
governed by jellyfish physiology or the glass-in-glass medium" were protected. Id. at 812. Even
these elements, however, were afforded only a thin copyright. Id.
256. Id. at 811 (stating additionally that others could not be prevented from "depicting
jellyfish swimming vertically because jellyfish swim vertically in nature and often are depicted
swimming vertically").
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the common heritage of humankind, and no artist may use copyright
law to prevent others from depicting them.
An artist may, however, protect the original expression he or she
contributes to these ideas. An artist may vary the pose, attitude,
gesture, muscle structure, facial expression, coat, or texture of
animal. An artist may vary the background, lighting, or perspective.
Such variations, if original, may earn copyright protection." 7
Finally, Dyer v. Napier 58 involved a photograph of a mother mountain
lion standing on the edge of a boulder with a cub in her mouth and a bronze
sculpture of a mother mountain lion with a cub in her mouth.259 Despite
evidence of access. 6 and similarity between the two works, the court
granted summary judgment for the defendant because only unprotected
elements were similar.26'

Specifically,

the court decided

that the

similarities were not substantial for three reasons: (1) "the 'idea' of the
protective nature of a mother mountain lion with her kitten is not
protected," (2) "similarity in expression aris[ing] from the use of a common
idea" cannot be the basis for a finding of substantial similarity, and (3) "the
image of a mother mountain lion holding a kitten in her mouth is expressed
by nature" and is not protected. 62 Additionally, the court stated that not
only was the image of the mother mountain lion with the cub in her mouth
not protected because it was expressed by nature, but also because the
image was "necessary to the expression of the underlying idea of the
protective nature of a mother mountain lion. 263 Citing Satava at length for
the proposition that images from nature belong to all, 26 the court similarly
held that despite this, the photograph had a thin copyright due to the
plaintiff's many artistic choices in its composition, such as location,
background, perspective, and angle. 65

These three cases show that even in traditional works of art, original
artistic expression in representations of nature can be undervalued or not
257. Id. at 813.
258. No. CIV 04-0408-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 2730747 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006).
259. Id. at *1; see also Andrew Berger, Rights of Photographers and Visual Artists, in
ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 2007 app. at 657-58 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. G-897, 2007) (pictures of the photograph and sculpture).
260. The defendant sculptor obtained a copy of the photograph at an art show. Id. at *2.
261. Id. at*1.
262. See id. at *6-7.
263. See id. at *9.
264. Id. at *7-8 (citing Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003)).
265. See id. at *9.The photograph was actually not of a mountain lion in the wild. The scene
captured in the photograph was staged. The photographer selected the site in advance, and then,
with the assistance of animal trainers, had the mountain lion pose on the edge of the boulder with
her cub. See id. at *1-2.
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recognized. The court in Franklin Mint carefully drew the line between
idea and expression and recognized the original artistic expression present
in ornithological art. Conversely, in Satava and Dyer, the court employed
reasoning that denies the presence of original artistic expression in almost
every realistic depiction of nature.
VI. CRITIQUE

After surveying copyright law generally and a number of cases
concerning natural works, it appears that many natural works do not
receive the protection they deserve. When artists who create natural works
seek to enforce their rights under § 106266 in an infringement action, they
often lose because the allegedly infringing work is found not to be
substantially similar. To quickly review what copyright law allows in
terms of similarity between two works, if a natural work is independently
created, it does not matter if it is similar to or even an exact duplicate of
another work. Similarity is also be irrelevant if artist B had access to artist
A's work, which inspired artist B to create a work of art depicting the same
element of nature, as long as artist B did not copy artist A's original
expression in the process of creating the work.2 67 Furthermore, artist B,
rather than creating the work by observing the real-life subject, can actually
copy artist A's work as long as artist B only copies ideas and expression
necessary to the depiction of those ideas. Artists cannot use copyright law
to monopolize a subject because they are the first to depict it. In each of
these scenarios, artist B's work is not substantially similar because there is
no similarity of protected expression.
The problem with the current state of copyright law as applied to
natural works is when artist B goes beyond copying ideas and expression
necessary to depict those ideas and copies originalartisticexpression, artist
B's work is still found not to be substantially similar to artist A's. This
occurs because original artistic expression in natural works is not
recognized or is undervalued. The nonrecognition or undervaluation of
original artistic expression in natural works can result in (or be the result
of) requiring too much originality, defining the idea depicted by the work
too broadly, considering too much expression as necessary to the depiction
of the idea, or assigning the work a thin copyright.

266. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (listing exclusive rights of copyright owners).
267. Again, intent to copy is irrelevant. Copying can be subconscious.
accompanying note 97.

See supra text
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Artistic Expression

The primary reason that original artistic expression is erroneously
allowed to be copied is that it is not recognized as such. A brief discussion
of expression as defined by artists and philosophers of art will help show
that natural works, even highly realistic works, generally contain a great
deal of original expression. Determining what is original artistic or
creative expression in copyright law is not the same as determining what it
is from the viewpoint of artists or philosophers of art. While the former
attempts to refrain from making aesthetic judgments about art,268 the latter
concerns itself primarily with making such determinations. 6 9 Moreover,
the definition of art is certainly not the same.7 ° However, a consideration
of what artists and art philosophers consider artistic or creative
expression 27 1 and how artists create is still worthwhile because there is
overlap between how judges and art professionals identify original artistic
expression,272 and courts have even turned to the art world for assistance in
deciding copyright cases.273
268. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (explaining that the requirement of
creativity does not include an aesthetic component); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (stating that the requirement of originality
does not include a requirement of "esthetic merit").
269. See, e.g., Vincent Tomas, Creativity in Art, 67 PHIL. REV. 1, 4 (1958) ("Although we do
not judge a work to be a work of creative art unless we believe it to be original, it is not enough
that we should judge it to be merely different or novel. In discourse about art, we use 'creative'
in an honorific sense, in a sense in which creative activity always issues in something that is
different in an interesting, important, fruitful, or other valuable way. If what the artist produces is
a novelty, yet indifferent or bad, we do not regard him as a creator.").
270. Compare supra text accompanying notes 13-16 (discussing the inclusive definition of
art in copyright law), with GORDON GRAHAM, PHILOSOPHY OF ARTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AESTHETICS 3-75 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining the many philosophies and theories of what is art and
why it is valued).
271. Legal scholars are not alone in their inability to definitively define the concept of artistic
expression or creativity; Picasso was once asked to define creativity, and he said, "I don't know,
and if I did I wouldn't tell you." THE CREATIVE PROCESS IN SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 31 (Hans
A. Krebs & Julian H. Shelley eds., 1975).
272. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S.CAL. L. REV. 247,
266-97 (1998) (discussing parallels between legal reasoning in copyright cases and aesthetic
theory).
273. See James H. Carter, They Know It When They See It: Copyright and Aesthetics in the
Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 773, 775 (1991) ("[C]ourts regularly take account of
published literary or art criticism of the works before them for various purposes when such
criticism is consistent with their own judgments."); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and
Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 11 (2001) ("Courts have
turned to the customs and understandings of the art community in determining whether certain
works are meant to be protected by [the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)].").
Additionally, despite Holmes's warning that judges should refrain from evaluating art, see supra
text accompanying note 68, it has been argued that courts do make aesthetic judgments in
copyright cases. See generally Gorman, supra; Yen, supra note 272. Therefore, judges should
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First, most philosophers of art and artists would not consider art that
realistically depicts nature to be a mere copy of nature. Rather, natural
works are a representationof nature.274 Art represents and does not merely
copy nature because it impossible to copy it: "Any depiction of nature that
tries just to copy must fail, partly because every 'copy' of nature must
involve seeing selectively, and partly because the work must reflect the
representational resources available to the painter." '75
Furthermore, artists make numerous choices when they create a work
of art. Even the creation of highly realistic works involves a myriad of
artistic choices, and the depiction of even simple objects is not as
straightforward as it may seem. For example, Stevan Dohanos, a wellknown illustrator and "passionate realist 276 described what the creation of
a common awning involves as follows:
We take for granted the so-called common object.... [M]aybe you
want to use an awning in a picture. Awnings can be endlessly
different in design and structure. Obviously you shouldn't settle for
an image you have in your mind of an awning. Through legwork or
professionally motivated curiosity, you will unearth tremendous
variations, artistic possibilities, in colors and shapes of awnings. 7
Dahanos also noted that the process of creating realistic images involves
constant editing and is not straightforward: "The final product may seem
ordinary and realistic, but there's been a continual process of editing and
278
designing throughout the period of preparing the picture.
This brief excursion into the world of philosophy and art is meant to
demonstrate that, contrary to how it is sometimes treated in the legal world,
the creation of natural works is much more than paint-by-numbers-an
artist's representation of nature is the result of a great deal of skill, choice,
understand notions of creativity and artistic expression as understood by artists and philosophers
of art because it will enable courts to make better decisions. See Yen, supra note 272, at 247.
274. See GRAHAM, supra note 270, at 104-05; see also id. at 111 ("Painters do not merely
imitate. They cannot be thought of as presenting 'raw' visual data which the spectator then
,observes.' ").
275. Id. at 105.
276.

MARY ANNE GUITAR, 22 FAMOUS PAINTERS AND ILLUSTRATORS TELL How THEY

WORK 55 (1964).
277. Id. at 57.
278. Id. at 63; see also JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 70-71 (Capricorn Books 1958)
(1934) ("Keats speaks poetically of the way in which artistic expression is reached when he tells
of the 'innumerable compositions and decompositions which take place between the intellect and
its thousand materials before it arrives at that trembling, delicate and snail-horn perception of
beauty.' "). This example is not meant to advocate that a work of art should be protected by
copyright because a lot of effort is used in creating it. As noted previously, copyright does not
reward artists for their labor, but rather only for their original expression, regardless of effort or
time spent creating the work. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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selection, and revision, which results in a very expressive work. The
recognition of original expression in natural works is not solely found in
the field of art; it has been recognized in copyright law as well. As Justice
Holmes indicated in Bleistein, "[tihe copy [drawn from life] is the personal
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a
very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
'
man's alone."279
Even in the most precise depiction of nature, this
personality is expressed through the numerous artistic choices that must be
made, including "pose, posture, and facial expression"28 and "proportion,
form,contour, configuration, and conformation."2 8'
Satava is the best example of a court undervaluing original artistic
expression.282 The Ninth Circuit treated almost every artistic decision
Satava made in the creation of the glass jellyfish sculptures as if it was
dictated by nature and the physiology of a jellyfish. The different colors
used by the artist were not even recognized as protected expression because
jellyfish naturally come in different colors.283 Although many aspects of
the sculpture were prescribed by the way a jellyfish actually looks, that
does not mean the way in which the artist specifically chose to depict the
jellyfish was in no way original.
B.

Originality

It is difficult to imagine a work of art that does not pass the very low
threshold required for originality.2"4 The work discussed herein found not
to be copyrightable-the fish mannequins in Har 2 8 5-- did not fall short of
this low standard. A work of art technically can be copyrighted even if it is
black paint on canvass.286 Feist did establish a threshold under which a
work is not sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection,8 but

279. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (emphasis added);
see also Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Sc~nes
Faire and
Merger Doctrinefor Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 853 (2006) (arguing that courts "fail
to understand or appreciate the creative opportunities to express and portray objects visually").
280. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988).
281. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1951).
282. See Murray, supra note 279, at 849-50 (2006) (citing Satava as an example of a court
not appreciating creativity in the selection and arrangement of the elements of a visual work).
283. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
284. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Mark Rothko, Black on Black (1964), reprinted in MARK ROTHKO: 19031970, at 170 (Stewart, Tabori, & Chang eds., rev. ed. 1996) (1987).
287. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991).
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anything with more than de minimus creativity is sufficient.28 8 As Justice
Holmes observed in Bleistein, "[t]he least pretentious picture has more
originality in it than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted."2 9
Therefore, although a fish mannequin may consist mostly of ideas and
may be subject to the merger doctrine, even the most realistic animal
sculpture is not entirely devoid of original expression,2 90 and a small
amount of original expression suffices to uphold copyright protection. The
consequences of a court deciding that a work as a whole is not
copyrightable for lack of originality are severe because it precludes an artist
from preventing even direct, actual copying. 9' For example, the jeweled
gold bee and turtle pins discussed previously 292 were also the subject of
litigation in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt293 and Herbert
294 respectively. In these two cases,
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt,
there was direct evidence of copying, and the defendants created identical
replicas of the plaintiffs pins. 295 The Second Circuit upheld the
preliminary injunction in both cases,2 96 because unlike in the cases

discussed previously,297 the court decided that the defendant went beyond

copying ideas and copied original expression. If the bee and turtle pins had
been denied copyright protection entirely because they allegedly consisted
of only unprotected ideas and expression necessary to the depiction of
those ideas, Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry would have been unable to prevent
this blatant, actual copying because anyone in the world would be free to
duplicate its pins.298 Admittedly, if a work lacks any original expression,

288. Id. at 363.
289. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). Of course, not all
directories are necessarily copyrightable, see Feist, 499 U.S. at 363 (denying copyright protection
to telephone directory listing subscriber's alphabetically by last name).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 279-81.
291. In addition to possessing a valid copyright, artists must register their U.S. works with the
U.S. Copyright Office before they can sue for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (2000).
292. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
293. 436 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1970).
294. 428 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1970).
295. See Grossbardt, 436 F.2d at 316 ("[D]efendants ...obtained one of Rosenthal's bees,
made a rubber mold from it, [and] duplicated the bee ....
");Grossbardt, 428 F.2d at 552-53
("[D]efendants do not dispute that they duplicated and sold a turtle pin basically identical to
plaintiff's copyrighted work.").
296. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d at 316, 318; Grossbardt, 428 F.2d at 552.
297. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
298. Inability to prevent actual, direct copying is also why the merger doctrine should be
applied when considering infringement rather than copyrightability. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 10, § 13.03[B][3] (stating that the merger doctrine should not be used to "disqualify
certain expressions from protection per se").
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the entire world should be free to create knock-offs, but a fish mannequin
and jeweled gold bee and turtle pins are not among those works.299
C. Definition of Idea
A court can undermine artists' ability to protect their works and
undervalue original artistic expression if it defines the scope of the
unprotected idea too broadly. What is an idea and what is expression is not
readily defined, 3" but demarcating the two correctly is important. Whether
an allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to another depends in
large part on what the court defines as the idea because substantially
similarity between ideas alone does not equal infringement.3" 1 For
example, in Dyer, the outcome of the case was driven in large part by the
court's definition of the idea-"the protective nature of a mother mountain
lion with her kitten."3 ° Given this broad definition of the idea, Dyer will
almost never be able to protect his photograph of the mother mountain lion
with the cub in her mouth at the edge of a boulder because the image is so
intertwined with the idea of the protectiveness of the lioness.30 3
299. This Comment will not go so far as to claim that under no circumstances should a natural
work be denied copyright protection for lack of originality. Given the de minimus requirement of
originality and the nature of art and artistic expression, however, it is very unlikely that a work
lacks the requisite originality just because it is inspired by, based on, or depicts nature.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
301. An excellent example of how the definition of the idea determines whether two works of
art are substantially similar is the discussion in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d
444 (S.D.N.Y 2005) of the photographs at issue in Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y 2001). The photographs depicted a businessman standing on the
edge of a tall building looking down from the vantage point of the businessman. See Mannion,
377 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68 (showing the two photographs). The court in Mannion considered the
possible definitions of the idea in the photograph and the consequences of adopting each of the
definitions:
But what is the 'idea' of Kaplan's photograph? Is it (1) a businessman contemplating
suicide by jumping from a building, (2) a businessman contemplating suicide by jumping
from a building, seen from the vantage point of the businessman, with his shoes set
against the street far below, or perhaps something more general, such as (3) a sense of
desperation produced by urban professional life?
If the 'idea' is (1) or, for that matter, (3), then the similarities between the two
photographs flow from something much more than that idea, for it have would [sic] been
possible to convey (1) (and (3)) in any number of ways that bear no obvious similarities
to Kaplan's photograph. (Examples are a businessman atop a building seen from below,
or the entire figure of the businessman, rather than just his shoes or pants, seen from
above.) If, on the other hand, the 'idea' is (2), then the two works could be said to owe
much of their similarity to a shared idea.
Id. at 456.
302. Dyer v. Napier, No. C1V 04-0408-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 2730747, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept.
25, 2006).
303. Id.
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Furthermore, he will likely be unable to protect any future photographs he
creates of a mother mountain lion with her cub if their posture and
positioning are such to convey the idea of protective nature. There are
numerous ways to express the idea of the protective nature of a mother
mountain lion, 3" all of which are not protected by copyright according to
the reasoning of the court in Dyer because they are necessary to expressing
this broad idea of protectiveness. A more appropriate definition of the idea
in Dyer would have been "a mother mountain lion with her cub in her
mouth." This would have correctly allowed other artists to depict this
naturally occurring image using their own expression while allowing the
artist to protect his particular expression of this idea.
D. Application of the Merger Doctrine
Likewise, the merger doctrine can be used too ambitiously to prevent
a proper finding of infringement." 5 Although the doctrine would be more
or less useless if it is applied only when the expression and the idea are
completely inseparable, applying it when there is more than a very limited
number of choices unduly limits an artist's ability to prove substantial
similarity. Specifically, if an idea can be expressed in a number of ways
and one artist expresses the idea in the same way as another artist, this
similarity should be considered evidence of copying,3t 6 and it should count
in the assessment of whether the works are substantially similar.0 7 If the
merger doctrine applies, however, the similarity is disregarded for the
purpose of evaluating similarities between two works because the
expression is unprotected. Therefore, when the merger doctrine is applied
inappropriately, an artist is unfairly prevented from proving infringement
absent showing near identity between the works.30 8
This was the result in Kalpakian.3 °9 The Ninth Circuit held that
because there was really only one way to express the idea of a jeweled bee
pin, the plaintiffs expression was not protected." 0 There are numerous
304. For example, a mother cleaning a cub, standing over a cub, or bringing food to a cub all
evoke the idea of her protective nature.
305. For an argument that the merger doctrine should not be applied at all to works of art or
photographs, see generally Murray, supra note 279.
306. This is assuming the artist of the allegedly infringing work had access to the other work
and the allegedly infringing work was not independently created.
307. Again, the requirement of substantial similarity arises in two contexts: whether the
defendant in fact copied and whether the copying is actionable. See supra notes 99-100 and

accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001).
309. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text; see also Murray, supra note 279, at
792-93 (arguing that Kalpakian is wrongly decided because there are numerous ways to depict a
jeweled bee pin).
310. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
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ways, however, to express a jeweled bee pin as evidenced by the fact that
the defendant had an entire line of bee pins that varied in size and in the
number, size, color, and kind of jewels on the pin.3 1' Moreover, if two
readers of this Comment presently closed their eyes and envisioned a gold,
jeweled bee pin, this author expects that those pins would differ greatly.
Yankee Candle312 also involved the application of the merger doctrine
when there were numerous ways to depict an idea.3 3 Admittedly, the
obvious choice of expression to depict the idea of the scent of a particular
fruit or flower is an image of the fruit or flower. There are, however, many
ways to depict the fruit or flower itself. For example, the image could
contain only the piece of fruit, or it could also contain leaves;3 14 and, the
color of the petals on the flower blossom or the skin of the fruit could be
different.3" 5 Additionally, depictions of nature should not be considered
more subject to the merger doctrine than other types of works. The amount
of original expression in a work can range from hardly any to a great deal,
and natural works as a class do not per se fall on the former end of the
spectrum." 6 The labels at issue in Yankee Candle may not have been
substantially similar once the court accounted for the fact that they
portrayed the same flower or fruit, but this broad application of the merger
doctrine to natural works generally may allow original artistic expression to
be freely copied in contravention of copyright law.
Defining too much expression as part of the idea or necessary to the
depiction of an idea can also allow insignificant dissimilarities in an
otherwise infringing work to prevent an appropriate finding of
infringement. This violates the well-known rule that "no copier may
defend the act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the copy he has
not pirated."31 7 Admittedly, small dissimilarities in the case of realistic
natural works can be significant. As previously discussed, however, there
is an incredible range of artistic choice and expression involved when
depicting nature, and "when two artists take up ... the painting of a portrait
311. See id. at 740; see also Murray, supra note 279, at 793 ("The amount of gold or other
metal used and exposed in the design, the size and shape and number of the gems or semiprecious stones used, the color, tone, shade, clarity, and brilliance of the gems or stones used,
whether the gems or stones will have few or many or no facets are simply the beginning of the
creative opportunities available to a designer of a jeweled bee pin.").
312. See supra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
313. See Murray, supra note 279, at 801 (discussing "expansive application of merger" in
Yankee Candle).
314. See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 37 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001)
(noting this difference in the cranberry labels).
315. See id. (noting this difference in the eucalyptus and mulberry labels).
316. See supra notes 268-81 and accompanying text.
317. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
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of the same subject from life, or of the same landscape at the same time of
the year, the wonder commonly excited is not at the resemblance, but over
the unlikeness. '318 Thus, when two works that depict the same animal, for
example, are completely alike save for one or two minor changes, such as
the size of the face, 319 the defendant should not necessarily avoid liability,
especially when there is strong evidence of actual copying.
E.

Thin Copyright

A potentially valid infringement claim can be undermined by a finding
that the copyright for a natural work is thin.32° The copyright in a work is
thin when it is substantially comprised of either works already in the public
domain or other unprotected elements such as facts and ideas.321 Highly
realistic natural works are said to have only a thin copyright because such
works supposedly copy what already appears in nature.322 Although the
idea of a thin copyright makes sense when dealing with relatively
straightforward factual compilations such as a telephone directory, it does
not translate to realistic natural works; are seventeenth-century Dutch stilllife and flower paintings any less magnificent because they so precisely
depict the subject?323

Or, to give a modem-day example, an artistic

movement called superrealism aims to depict a subject as realistically as a
photograph.324

Two superrealist works depicting the same element of

nature will necessarily be similar, but cursorily dismissing a legitimate
claim of infringement because the copyright protection for the work is thin

318. Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1924); see also Murray, supra note
279, at 852-53 (noting dissimilarity between Monet's and Renoir's paintings of people swimming
at a pond despite the fact that the two artists stood next to each other while painting the scene).
319. See supra text accompanying note 204.
320. See, e.g., Dyer v. Napier, No. CIV 04-0408-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 2730747, at *9 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006).
321. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
322. See, e.g., Dyer, 2006 WL 2730747, at *9; Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir.
2003); First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 178, 186
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (a pre-Feist decision stating that the copyright was "weak").
323. See Baroque Art, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ART 255, 351 (Inst. for Cultural
Collaboration ed., 1960) (stating that still-life painting in the Netherlands involved an
"illusionistic presentation of flowers, insects, and smaller animals [with] almost scientific
precision"); Valentin Denis et al., Flemish and Dutch Art, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ART
402, 437 (Inst. for Cultural Collaboration ed., 1961) ("The multicolored Dutch 'bouquet' was
generally rendered with as much finesse and evidenced as precise an observation of nature as a
scientific botanical study."); see also id. at 438 (noting that the "most beautiful Dutch still-life
paintings" in the late seventeenth century resulted "not from slavish imitation of nature but from
the power of convincing selective recall").
324. See Superrealism,in GARDNER'S, supra note 86, at 1054, 1054-56.
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due to lack of original artistic expression does not seem right.325 Once
again, works of art, even highly realistic ones, are always personal to the
artist.32 6
Moreover, superrealist paintings and sculptures are quite
327
impressive and their existence surely enriches cultural life. To label
these works as possessing only a thin copyright undermines an artists'
ability to protect the work, which in turn undermines the purpose of
'
copyright to "advance the public welfare through the talents of authors"328
via an economic incentive.
329
Finally, an excerpt from Leonardo da Vinci's Treatise on Painting
highlights why it is troubling to conclude that works of art depicting nature
have a thin copyright because they consist mostly of unprotected elements.
In Treatise on Painting, Leonardo describes in detail elements of nature
and how to paint those elements of nature; he describes how to represent a
storm as follows:
If you wish to represent a storm well, consider and place before
your mind the effects of the wind, blowing over the surface of the
sea and the earth, as it removes and carries with it those things which
are not firmly imbedded in the mass of the earth. In order to
represent the storm well first of all paint the clouds, torn and rent,
swept along by the course of the wind, together with the sandy
powder lifted from the seashores; include branches and leaves, raised
by the powerful fury of the wind, scattered through the air, as well as
many other light objects. The trees and grass are bent against the
earth, seeming almost as if they were trying to follow the course of

325. See, e.g., Graham v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing the
commercial success of superrealist artists and how the paintings must be original, in the aesthetic
sense, or else no one would buy them).
326. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
327. See, e.g. Chuck Close, Big Self-Portrait(1967-68), reprintedin GARDNER'S, supra note
86, at 1056. Another type of art for which it would not be appropriate to grant only thin
protection because it involves nature is "eco-installations." See Aleksandra Maiiczak, The
Ecological Imperative: Elements of Nature in Late Twentieth-Century Art, 35 LEONARDO 131
(2002). An eco-installation is a work of art that incorporates elements of nature themselves. The
artist who creates an eco-installation either takes objects out of nature and uses them as part of a
sculpture or installation or the artist manufactures a landscape. See generally id. (discussing
examples of eco-installation). Although the works incorporate elements of nature, which are
arguably unprotected for lack of originality because they do not originate with the artist, see
supra text accompanying notes 52-55, the work includes a great deal of original artistic
expression: the artist selected the specific materials or landscape and arranged the selected
elements in a creative fashion in order to convey a specific message. See Maficzak, supra, at
131-32 (noting how eco-installations can be a means of commenting on environmental issues).
328. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
329. LEONARDO DA VINcI, TREATISE ON PAINTING (CODEX URBINAS LATINUS 1270) (A.
Philip McMahon trans., 1956).
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the winds, with their branches twisted out of their natural direction,
their leaves battered and turned upside down.y °
Although Leonardo describes a storm realistically, it would seem
dubious to argue that this passage has a thin copyright because it contains
mostly unprotected ideas or facts.3 3' The passage is a very expressive
description of what occurs when a storm hits. If an artist, however, sat on
the seashore during a storm and painted or photographed the scene before
her, these are precisely the arguments that would be made, and likely
accepted by a court, if another artist copied her work and the artist sued for
copyright infringement.
CONCLUSION

Copyright law should not hinder the advancement of the arts in
contravention of its constitutional purpose. The monopolization of ideas
thwarts the goal of copyright law and should never be allowed. Equally
prejudicial to progress, however, is not adequately protecting artists'
exclusive rights in their original works of art and photographs. The drafters
of the Constitution decided that the best way to achieve the constitutional
purpose of copyright was to encourage creation with an economic
incentive. The economic incentive is diminished, however, if original
artistic expression is not protected because artists' ability to economically
exploit their works is severely undermined.
Original artistic expression in works of art depicting nature, especially
highly realistic works, is not adequately protected by copyright law. It is
often undervalued or not recognized, and the current methods of identifying
whether original expression has been copied are misapplied to natural
works. This Comment does not propose to have an answer to this difficult
dilemma. For copyright law to achieve its constitutional goal, a delicate
balance must be struck between securing artists a reward for their creativity
and making works and ideas available to the public. A possible first step
towards finding this balance for natural works is to develop a new approach
to identifying original expression in works of art and photographs depicting
nature and whether an artist has copied another's protected expression of
nature.33
330. Id. at 114.

33 1. A counterargument is that this passage does have a thin copyright because Leonardo is
merely describing how to do something (paint a storm), similar to an instruction manual. See,
e.g., Dennis S.Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and
ProfessorMiller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 975, 1001 (1994) (noting that instruction manuals have a

thin copyright).
332. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch. Corp., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.
1978) ("Troublesome, too, is the fact that the same general principles are applied in claims

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Whatever the solution, one is needed because artists who create
natural works have contributed greatly to the advancement of the arts, and
they should not be punished for choosing to use their talents to depict
nature. Most artists are certainly not motivated by financial gain alone, and
the creation of natural works has not come to a grinding halt despite the
current state of the law. However, the ability to make a living from the
economic exploitation of their work gives artists additional time and
resources to create even more works of art. 3
Therefore, adequately
protecting natural works will ensure that the public is not denied the reward
of works created by a future Monet, O'Keeffe, C6zanne, Adams, or
4
Barye.

33
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involving plays, novels, sculpture, maps, directories of information, musical compositions, as
well as artistic paintings. Isolating the idea from the expression and determining the extent of
copying required for unlawful appropriation necessarily depend to some degree on whether the
subject matter is words or symbols written on paper, or paint brushed onto canvas."); see also
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458-61 (S.D.N.Y 2005) (discussing at
length the problem with the idea/expression dichotomy as applied to visual works). It is feasible
to develop new approaches based on the type of work. For example, in regard to computer
programs, the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test developed to determine whether two
programs are substantially similar. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 99, §§ 8:5 to
8:5.3.
333. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Thx. L. REV.
1535, 1540-41 (2005) (discussing how copyright "makes creativity and dissemination possible
for some authors who could not otherwise afford to create and share their works"). But see
William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 909 (1996) (arguing that modem copyright law financially benefits
distributors but not authors).
334. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
** I would like to thank Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law Laura
N. Gasaway and Copyright and Scholarly Communications Director, Director of the Intellectual
Property Initiative, and Adjunct Professor of Law Deborah R. Gerhardt for their comments,
advice, and encouragement.

